Sole Shareholder Of Company That Owns Contaminated Property Can Be Held Liable Under CERCLA As Current Operator

In the case of Litgo v. Martin, 2011 WL 65933 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2011) the federal District Court of New Jersey held that a shareholder of a single-purpose entity that owns a contaminated facility is liable as a current operator under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601 et al. (“CERCLA”).  In 1983, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) was ordered to clean up a property located in Newark, New Jersey.  NJDEP removed drums of hazardous waste from the Newark site and stored them at a warehouse located at 40 Haynes Road, Somerville, New Jersey (the “Site”).  The warehouse at the Site was determined to be contaminated with hazardous substances.

While the remediation at this Site was being conducted by NJDEP, plaintiff Sheldon Goldstein entered into negotiations with the current owner of the Site.  On August 6, 1985, the current owner of this Site entered into an agreement to sell the Site to plaintiff Goldstein.  Subsequently a dispute broke out over the sale of the Site and the Court ultimately ordered the plaintiff Goldstein to take title to the Site.  On February 14, 1990, plaintiff Goldstein took title to the Site and pursuant to the contract of sale assumed the obligations to clean up the Site.  On April 14, 1990, plaintiff Goldstein transferred the Site to plaintiff Litgo New Jersey, Inc.

In 2006, plaintiffs filed suit against NJDEP alleging that the State failed to properly remediate the Site.  Plaintiffs’ suit was under various claims including CERCLA.  The NJDEP filed a counterclaim.  At trial, the District Court found that plaintiff Goldstein, as a shareholder in Litgo, the current owner of the Site, was liable under CERCLA as a current operator.  On a motion for reconsideration, the Court upheld the trial Court’s determination regarding plaintiff Goldstein’s liability as an operator.

The plaintiffs argued that Goldstein’s involvement with the cleanup of this Site was insufficient to impose liability on Goldstein as a current operator under CERCLA.  The Court addressing this issue explained that under CERCLA, past owners and operators are liable only to the extent that a discharge of hazardous substances occurred at the Site during their ownership or operations.  However, current owners and operators are liable under CERCLA regardless of whether hazardous substances were discharged at the Site during their ownership or at the time they operated at a site.  The Court observed that the parties do not dispute that Litgo, as a current owner of the Site, is liable under CERCLA.  The Court, however, dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that Goldstein could not be held liable as a current operator.  The Court, distinguishing the cases relied upon by the Plaintiffs, concluded that because of his involvement with this Site, the plaintiff Goldstein could be liable as a current operator.  The Court specifically noted the following:

Plaintiffs have been involved with the property for two decades and were responsible for environmental compliance decisions and decisions not to proceed with the remediation. … We believed the decision to delay remediation may have increased the threat to the environment and public health. ... Given these considerations, the Court is not persuaded that it should reconsider its decision as to Goldstein’s liability.


The instructive value of this case is that sole shareholders of single entity companies can be held liable under CERCLA to cleanup contamination for which its company is responsible.  Factors that will be used in determining whether a shareholder should be held liable is the actual control the shareholder has over the day to day operations of the company causing the contamination.  By being proactive and ensuring compliance with environmental laws can a sole shareholder minimize exposure to liability for environmental contamination.

Getting Heard: When Are Hearings Before the NJDEP or Courts Available?

Every day, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”) makes many decisions which disappoint the agency’s varied stakeholders. Individuals are upset with NJDEP land use permitting decisions, either because they prevent planned development or allow development on adjacent properties. Permit applicants are upset with limitations placed upon various wastewater or air emissions discharge permits. The ways by which parties may be unhappy with NJDEP decisions are seemingly endless. If a party is aggrieved by an NJDEP decision, what options are there? Go to Court? Seek a hearing before an administrative law judge? This article will explore some of those possibilities.

Hearings Before an Administrative Law Judge

Under the New Jersey Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. (the “APA”), whether a hearing before an administrative law judge is available depends upon the status of the aggrieved party. Was the petitioning party directly impacted by the NJDEP’s “permit decision” or is the petitioner a third party only indirectly impacted by the agency action? Procedurally, an aggrieved party submits a hearing request to the NJDEP Commissioner’s office. If the Commissioner determines that the petitioner has standing and the request has merit, then the Commissioner will transfer the matter to the Office of Administrative Law to be handled as a contested case before an administrative law judge. A “permit decision” is defined to mean “a decision by a State agency to grant, deny, modify, suspend or revoke any agency license, permit, certificate, approval, chapter, registration or other form of permission required by law ….” N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2. This definition is quite broad and would include most, if not all, public agency decisions, including, for instance, those related to land use permits, air or water emissions permits, site remediation decisions, etc.

Where the party wishing to challenge the NJDEP “permit decision” is the party directly involved in, or impacted by, the permit decision, that party has a right to contest the NJDEP “permit decision” through a contested case hearing before an administrative law judge. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c).   The analysis is more complex with respect to the rights of parties other than an applicant to obtain a trial-like administrative hearing. 

The APA declares that state agencies may not promulgate rules which allow third parties to appeal from permitting decisions unless such hearings are authorized by federal or state statute. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.1d. Third Parties are defined to include “any person other than: [a.] An applicant for any agency license, permit, certificate, approval, chapter, registration or other form of permission required by law; [b.] A State agency; or [c.] A person who has particularized property interest sufficient to require a hearing on constitutional or statutory grounds.”  N.J.S.A. 52:14B-3.2. 

There are therefore two means by which a third party has a right to an adjudicatory hearing before an agency – either there is specific statutory entitlement to a hearing or Due Process considerations require a hearing. To establish a Due Process right, the party must “demonstrate a particularized property interest of constitutional significance that is directly affected by an agency’s permitting decision.” In re NJPDES Permit No. NJ0025241, 185 N.J. 474, 482 (2006). In NJPDES Permit, the Court noted that “third parties are generally not able to meet the stringent requirements for constitutional standing in respect of an adjudicatory hearing” and that in New Jersey, “there has been legislative recognition of the benefits derived from a rigorous review standard when inquiring into the particularized property interest that generates a third-party hearing right.” Id.

In I/M/O Freshwater Wetlands Statewide General Permits, 185 N.J. 452 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court looked at whether adjacent property owners had a right to a hearing to challenge permitting decisions under the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act. The neighbors asserted that they had standing because the issuance of a wetlands permit could lead to increased flooding on their properties. In ruling that the third parties had no standing, the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that “the objector’s claim of a particularized constitutional interest in potential worse flooding to their properties was based on pure speculation and added that the local planning board presumably would scrutinize [the developer’s] drainage system to assure that such flooding did not occur. Fear of injury to a property interest … is not a sufficient constitutional basis for an adjudicatory hearing.” I/M/O Freshwater Wetlands 185 N.J. at 461.

In addition to the standing requirements (i.e., a statutory right or a constitutionally recognized property interest), to obtain an administrative hearing a third party must also demonstrate that there are disputed material facts warranting a trial-like administrative hearing. “[A]n evidentiary hearing is mandated only when the proposed administrative action is based upon disputed adjudicatory facts.” Spalt v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 237 N.J. Super 206, 212 (App. Div. 1989). As explained in High Horizons Development Company v. Dep’t of Transportation, 120 N.J. 40 (1990), “adjudicative facts have been defined … as facts pertaining to parties and their business and activities. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. In contrast, legislative facts, the determination of which will not normally require a trial-type hearing, do not usually concern the immediate parties, but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.” High Horizons, 120 N.J. at 49-50 (internal quotations omitted).

Disputes Relating to Site Remediation

When disputes arise between the NJDEP and a party conducting a site remediation, there are several options, including a “chain of command” dispute resolution process, an expedited dispute resolution or a proceeding before the Technical Review Panel. 

As set forth in the rules governing “Department Oversight of the Remediation of Contaminated Sites,” N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.1, et seq., and guidance relating to the Technical Review Panel, the process always involves first trying to reach a resolution with the Case Manager. See e.g., N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.4(b)-(h). In the “chain of command” approach, if discussions with the Case Manager prove unsuccessful, a written request for dispute resolution can be sent to the Case Manager’s Section Chief. If the requester is not satisfied with the Section Chief’s response, then another written request can be submitted to the applicable Bureau Chief. If that fails, the next written request goes to the applicable Assistant Director, and the next letter then goes to the applicable Director. Finally, the last letter goes to the Director, Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner for resolution. The Commissioner-level decision is required within 21 days of the written request. A response to each of the “preliminary” letters is required within 7 days of the written request. That is the long approach. The NJDEP regulations also establish an expedited review option which circumvents the initial steps and allows for the request for dispute resolution to be submitted directly to the Commissioner. See N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.4(i). 

If the “chain of command” or expedited review options prove unsuccessful to the party conducting the remediation, that party must go through the NJDEP’s alternative dispute resolution process before the matter will be deemed a contested case and sent by the Commissioner to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing. See N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.4(j)-(k). Finally, both the “chain of command” and expedited review options are significantly limited because they do not apply to, among other things, “[t]echnical issues which arise during Department oversight of remediation” or legal issues. See N.J.A.C. 7:26C-1.4(l)2 and 3.

To address technical disputes, the NJDEP has a established a process whereby the NJDEP will assemble an internal “Technical Review Panel” to review the remediation dispute. To obtain a technical panel review of a technical dispute related to a site remediation, the remediating party must first follow a process set forth in the NJDEP’s guidance. See http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/guidance/techreview/rev_tech_disputes.htm. The first steps towards resolving the dispute are the same as those set forth above. The aggrieved party must first attempt to reach an agreement with the Case Manager, and then the Case Manager’s immediate supervisor. The process continues up the chain of command until the Case Manager’s Bureau Chief determines the issue. If the Bureau Chief’s response/resolution is still unsatisfactory, then the aggrieved party can seek review by the Technical Review Panel. The request for such review must be in writing and directed to the Assistant Commissioner of the Site Remediation and Waste Management program. The request must include a summary of the issue, the history of the attempted dispute resolution and the identification of any applicable deadlines. The party may also request a meeting before the Technical Review Panel. Finally, no new information may be presented in the request.

The Technical Review Panel will not be convened if the dispute (i) involves an enforcement action, (ii) addresses natural resource damage assessments, (iii) relates to a party’s liability for the cleanup or (iv) involves a matter of policy. If a Technical Review Panel is convened, it will consist of three Assistant Director level employees or their designated manager. A designated manager cannot be the Bureau Chief who previously reviewed the dispute. There is no required deadline for the Technical Review Panel to issue its determination.

A review of published Technical Review Panel decisions on the NJDEP’s website indicates that aggrieved parties either prevailed in their claim or, more often, received some change of the NJDEP’s initial requirements (i.e., the disputed requirements) in 35 % of the published cases (5 of 14 cases). It is an open question whether a denial of the requested relief from the Technical Review Panel would be a final agency action from which an appeal to the Appellate Division could be made. Nevertheless, were such an appeal taken, the likelihood of success would be low due to the courts’ general deference to an agency when the subject matter of the dispute falls within an agency’s particular expertise. 

Finally, it is worth noting that the newly passed Licensed Site Professional Bill (see http://www.environmentalandenergylawmonitor.com/tags/licensed-site-professional/), which is expected to be signed into law by Governor Corzine, may change the need for addressing technical disputes regarding site remediation projects. 

Going to Court

Access to the courts to challenge agency decisions generally requires that the petitioner first exhaust all of its administrative remedies. New Jersey Court Rule 2:2-3(a)(2) provides that a litigant may not generally seek appellate review of an administrative decision when “there is available a right of review before any administrative agency or officer, unless the interest of justice requires otherwise.” R. 2:2-3(a)(2). Furthermore, in Abbott v. Burke, 100 N.J. 269 (1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court noted that “[in] general, available and appropriate administrative remedies should be fully explored before judicial action is sanctioned.” Id. at 296.

The Court cited three significant policy reasons for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies: “(1) the rule ensures that claims will be heard, as a preliminary matter, by a body possessing expertise in the area; (2) administrative exhaustion allows the parties to create a factual record necessary for meaningful appellate review; and (3) the agency decision may satisfy the parties and thus obviate resort to the courts.” Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted).

Yet, the Court also indicated that “the preference for exhaustion of administrative remedies is one of convenience, not an indispensable pre-condition.” Id. 100 at 297 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, it is only in limited circumstances that a court will permit a litigant to circumvent the exhaustion requirement. Those situations include “when the administrative remedies would be futile; when irreparable harm would result; when jurisdiction of the agency is doubtful; or when an overriding public interest calls for a prompt judicial decision.” Id. at 298 (citations omitted). Additionally, the exhaustion doctrine is often inapplicable “when only a question of law need be resolved.” Id. “However, even in cases involving only legal questions, jurisdiction should remain with the agency where the agency is in a special position to interpret its enabling legislation, can conclusively resolve the issue . . . and can provide relief for the plaintiff.” Triano v. Div. of State Lottery, 306 N.J. Super. 114, 122 (App. Div. 1997).

Conclusion

As can be seen, there are many considerations which must be made in determining how to respond to an unfavorable NJDEP determination. Given the court’s and administrative law judges’ general deference to agency expertise, there can be significant hurdles to reversing NJDEP determinations. 

A version of this article appeared in the November 24, 2008 issue of the New Jersey Law Journal.

EPA Regulates Home Improvements To Address Risk Of Lead Paint

On March 31, 2008, the United  States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), under the authority of the federal Toxic Substances Control Act, issued new rules governing home improvement contractors and maintenance companies engaged in the renovation and repair of houses, child‑care facilities and schools constructed before 1978.  The purpose of the rule is to protect children from lead paint hazards in places they frequent.  EPA’s rules require that by April 2010, contractors and maintenance professionals performing renovation activities be certified and their employees trained by certified renovators.  The rules also require that these companies use safe work practices to eliminate airborne lead exposure from the renovation activities.

The rule applies to home improvement contractors, maintenance workers in multi‑family housing, painters and other trades engaged in renovation activities.  The covered facilities include residential, public or commercial buildings where children under the age of 6 are present on a regular basis, as well as all rental housing.  The rule applies to renovation, repair or repainting activity.  The only exceptions are (i) owner‑occupied housing where children under six or a pregnant woman do not reside; (ii) minor maintenance or repair activities affecting six square feet or less of lead based paint in a room or 20 square feet or less of lead based paint on the exterior of a building and (iii) renovations that do not involve the disturbance of lead based paint.  Determining whether a project is lead free must be made by a certified renovator using an EPA recognized test kit.

The rule prohibits certain unsafe work practices such as flame burning or torching; and sanding, grinding, or blasting with power tools.  It also prohibits the use of equipment not equipped with high efficiency vacuum attachments to minimize or eliminate airborne dust.

A certified renovator must be assigned to each renovation project to direct and train uncertified workers and to insure that all work is performed in accordance with applicable work practices and standards as outlined in the rules.  A renovator can become certified by successfully completing an EPA approved accredited training course.  To maintain the certification, a person must complete an accredited refresher course every five years.

While these regulations directly impact the companies doing the renovations, property owners must remember that they are ultimately responsible for the safety of their tenants.  It is imperative, therefore, that property owners make sure that the contractor intends to comply with the EPA’s regulations and minimize lead hazards during the work.  Any contract between the property owner and renovation contractor should, at a minimum, include a provision requiring the contractor to comply with all laws during the performance of the work and an indemnification provision whereby the contractor agrees to defend and indemnify the property owner from lawsuits arising from the contractor’s work.  Since an indemnification is only as good as the company’s assets, a property owner is well advised to require the contractor to have insurance naming the property owner as an additional named insured on the policy.  As an additional named insured, the property owner will be in a position to make a claim against the contractor’s insurance policy.  By taking these precautions, property owners will minimize their exposure to potential liability if the contractor fails to comply with these regulations.

Enforcement Power of NJDEP Increased

On January 4, 2008, the New Jersey legislature passed the Environmental Enforcement Enhancement Act. This Act enhances the enforcement authority of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) under ten environmental statutes: Waterfront Development Act, Pesticide Control Act of 1971, Wetlands Act of 1970, Freshwater Protection Act, Coastal Area Facility Review Act, Endangered and Nongame Species Conservation Act, Water Supply Management Act, Safe Dam Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Flood Hazard Area Control Act. The Act also amends the DEP enabling statute by clarifying DEP’s authority to inspect facilities, collect samples and copy documents to determine compliance with environmental laws, regulations, permits, and orders.

The Act strengthens the enforcement provisions of the ten statutes listed above and substantially increases the penalties DEP may seek against violators. The Act greatly broadens the enforcement authority of the DEP by authorizing it to issue an order requiring any person to comply, to bring a civil action, to levy a civil administrative penalty, or to petition the attorney general to bring a criminal action if a violation occurs. The amendments are substantial because many statutes prior to the passage of the Act only contained minimal penalties for violators or did not contain any provisions for assessing administrative penalties. For example, the Waterfront Development Act’s previous maximum penalty was $1,000 with an additional fine of $100 for each day the violation continued. As amended the penalty is increased to $25,000 per violation, per day. 

To help ensure compliance with environmental statutes, the Act significantly increases civil and criminal penalties including the following changes: (1) uniformly increases the maximum civil penalty amount to $25,000 per day; (2) authorizes daily penalty assessments for continuing violations; (3) authorizes the recovery of compensatory damages for loss or destruction of natural resources (e.g.-creates authority for DEP to recover natural resource damages, which are money damages from anyone responsible for spills or discharges of hazardous substances); (4) authorizes the DEP to recover reasonable costs incurred by the State in removing or correcting a violation, and to recover all reasonable costs incurred in bringing a civil action, which could be interpreted to mean recovery of attorneys’ fees; and (4) clarifies and in some statutes creates criminal provisions for purposeful, knowing, and reckless violations or falsifications. In addition, the Act broadens the DEP’s authority to compel a property owner to record a deed notice on its property where an alleged violation has occurred, under acts such as the Dam Safety Act or the Flood Hazard Protection Act. Prior to the Act’s passage the DEP only had this authority for a violation of the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act. In fact, the Act allows DEP to require the recording of such a notice based only upon an allegation prior to adjudication.

With the passage of this Act, DEP has increased its enforcement authority and permits it to seek higher penalties for violations that may have previously been cost effective to commit and new avenues to seek such penalties. Its passage will likely lead to an increase in enforcement actions brought by the DEP.